This paper proposed the application of post-encryption-compression (PEC) to strengthen the secrecy in the case of distributed encryption where the encryption keys are correlated to each other. We derive the universal code construction for the compression and the rate region where codes with achievability and secrecy are obtainable.
I. INTRODUCTION

Background
In this paper, we consider the problem of strenghtening the security of communication in multi-source singledestination network. Especially, we are interested on practical solutions with minimum modifications which can be applied even on already running systems. More precisely, we consider a network system described as follows: multiple sources X 1 and X 2 are processed in separated nodes, and then sent through their respective public communication channels to a joint sink node. Now suppose that an already running system has a potential secrecy/privacy problem such that (X 1 , X 2 ) might be leaked to an adversary which is eavesdropping all public communication channel.
A common measure to prevent the leaking of (X 1 , X 2 ) to such eavesdropper is by encrypting each source using one time pad encryption in its respective corresponding node before it is sent to the public channel. For i = 1, 2, let X i be encrypted using key K i into C i = X i ⊕K i . Instead of sending X 1 and X 2 , the system sends the ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 to public communication channels. Obviously, if K 1 and K 2 are ideally generated such that each is following uniform distribution and is independent to each other, no problem is left as H(X 1 X 2 |C 1 C 2 ) = H(X 1 X 2 ) holds automatically. Note that this means that the pair of ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 ) does not give any additional information
Fundamental Idea for Practical Solution: Compression of Keys
Our fundamental idea for solution is based on our intuition that the correlation between compressed keys is smaller than correlation of uncompressed keys. We can explain our intuition as follows. First, recall that the amount of correlation between two random sources K 1 , K 2 is directly proportional to the mutual information between K 1 and K 2 , i.e., I(K 1 ; K 2 ).
1 For simplicity, let K 1 and K 2 are taking values from the same set of n dimensional vectors K n . Let ϕ be a mapping from K n onto a set of m dimensional vectors K m , where where n > m. One may simply treat ϕ as a kind of compression function. Using the fact that H(K 2 |ϕ(K 1 )) ≥ H(K 2 |K 1 ) and H(ϕ(K 1 )|ϕ(K 2 )) ≥ H(ϕ(K 1 )|K 2 ) hold, it is easy to derive the following inequations.
The above inequations (2) basically says that compressing the keys (K 1 , K 2 ) may reduce the effect of correlation between them. Thus, one immediate approach is to compress the keys directly before inputting them into the encryption process.
Infeasibility of Direct Compression of Keys: However, recall that there are two points of inputs to the encryption in each node, i.e., source and key, Thus, if we want to use the compressed keys as the new keys to the encryption, in order to guarantee secrecy, in general, we also have to compress the messages. Especially in the case of one-time pad encryption, we need to compress the messages to an extent that the lengths are same with the compressed keys. This means we have to perform compression two times for each node. Moreover, in real world, the devices at the nodes might have the keys hardwired into the electronic circuit, and thus modification of the keys before the encryption will require us a special technique to perform a hardware intrusion without bringing down the already running system. Obviously, this kind of modification is risky or impossible in some cases. Therefore, we conclude that direct compression of keys at the point of inputs to encryption is practically infeasible in general.
Hence, we narrow the research question into the following: Can we find a better method for compression such that we do not need to modify inputs of encryption directly and requires less number of compressions than two times for each node?
Proposed Solution: Indirect Compression of Keys through Compression of Ciphertexts using Affine Encoders
The main result in this paper is that we discover a method to perform compression on the keys indirectly by compressing the ciphertexts. We only need to perform the compression only once for each node and thus the implementation cost is only about half of the method which performs compressions on inputs before encryption described above. The core of our discovery is the specific construction of an affine encoder as a good compression function. We prove that the result of compression of a ciphertext from one-time pad encryption using our affine encoder can be seen as one-time pad encryption of a compressed message with a compressed key.
1 Also recall that when K 1 and K 2 are independent and have no correlation, I(K 1 ; K 2 ) = 0 holds, while if K 1 and K 2 are not independent and have some correlation, I(
As a illustration, for i-th node (i = 1, 2), let affine encoder ϕ i be associated with a linear encoder φ i and a vector a i , and let ϕ i be defined such that ϕ i (x) = φ i (x) ⊕ a i . Using ϕ i , we compress the ciphertext of i-th node,
Thanks to the homomorphic property of linear encoder
and we obtain the following equation.
Here we set
We can see φ i (X i ) as the compressed source and K i as the compressed key.
Hence, an eavesdropper which collects ( C 1 , C 2 ) from public communication channels will see (Y 1 , Y 2 ) as results of one-time pad encryption with compressed keys (ϕ 1 (K 1 ), ϕ 2 (K 2 )) which has less correlation compared to the
We borrow the technique of Oohama [1] on generating randomness using Slepian-Wolf coding [2] to make the joint distribution of compressed keys which are hidden within the compressed ciphertexts exponentially close to the uniform distribution that the effect of correlation between the keys becomes negligible. Furthermore, we borrow the result of Csiszár [3] to show that we can obtain good linear encoders and decoders such that in joint sink node the original sources data can be retrieved with exponentially negligible error probability.
We prove that the code construction can be made to depend on only transmission rates using the universal code technique. As far as our knowledge, our result is the first to show explicitly that the preserving of code structure which is the property of affine encoders constructed from linear encoders is essential in order to amplify the secrecy and to preserve the achievability at the same time in the case of distributed encodings/encryption. One can see that our result is in parallel with the existing work of Körner and Marton [4] in the sense that [4] shows that the preserving of code structure by linear encoders is essential in order to prove the optimal transmission rate in the case of two helper network systems.
Practical Feasibility of Proposed Solution
In practice, our approach does not require hardware intrusion to the terminal devices. We can modify the output of the encryption easily by simply connecting the already existing device in each node with an additional external equipment which is capable to receive the ciphertext from the encryption process as inputs, encode them using specified linear codes, and then finally output the encoded ciphertext to the public communication channel. In order to prevent that the leak of pre-encoded original ciphertexts to the eavesdropper in the case of wireless communication,
we can apply a simple idea to enclose the existing device and the additional equipment in a Faraday cage so that no electronic signal carrying the pre-encoded ciphertexts leaks outside.
On modification of joint sink node: We remark that our proposed solution which will be described in detail at later sections actually requires the modification of the input and the output of the joint sink node. We argue that despite this requirement, our approach is still feasible and practical. We can consider the joint sink node as a kind of information processing center in real world. And it is quite natural to assume that in such center, the processing tasks are carried by general-purpose machines with high modularity, that the components are easy to be separated, modified, and recombined without disrupting the already running system.
Related Works
Randomness generation problem in distributed networks with multi-terminals has been researched by Muramatsu et al. [5] , Oohama [1] . However, these works only focus on the secrecy and randomness issue and do not take into account the issue of achievability. Csiszár has shown in [3] that one can easily use linear codes to construct universal coding for all achievable rates in Slepian-Wolf networks. However, this work only focus on the achievability and do not touch security related issues.
Johnson et al. [6] has proposed a model similar to our setting in a sense that they try to reach both achievability and secrecy at the same time using a similar encryption-then-compress paradigm. However, they only focused on achieving achievability and secrecy using a specific kind of encoders and compression method and they do not show whether the encoders and compression method satisfy the universality. In this paper, we show a more general results in the sense that we show that any good linear encoder which attain random coding error exponent can be used to construct compression function which satisfy both achievability and secrecy and also we show that our construction satisfies the universality. Moreover, Johnson et al [6] only consider secrecy in asymptotic setting, while in this paper we consider the secrecy in concrete setting with concrete exponential upper bound of the success probability of an eavesdropper revealing the sources from compressed ciphertexts in public channel.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we show the basic notations and related consensus used in this paper. Also, we explain the basic system setting and basic adversarial model we consider in this paper.
Random Sources of Information and Keys: Let (X 1 , X 2 ) be a pair of random variables from a finite set X 1 × X 2 .
Let {(X 1,t , X 2,t )} ∞ t=1 be a stationary discrete memoryless source(DMS) such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., the pair (X 1,t , X 2,t ) takes values in finite set X 1 × X 2 and obeys the same distribution as that of (X 1 , X 2 ) denoted by
is specified with P X1X2 . Also, let (K 1 , K 2 ) be pair of random variables taken from the same finite set X 1 × X 2 representing the pair of keys used for encryption at two separate terminals, of which the detailed description will be presented later. Similarly, let
be a stationary discrete memoryless source such that for each t = 1, 2, . . ., the pair (K 1,t , X K,t ) takes values in finite set X 1 × X 2 and obeys the same distribution as that of (
is specified with P K1K2 .
Random Variables and Sequences:
We write the sequence of random variables with length n from the information source as follows:
Similarly, the strings with length n of X n 1 and X n 2 are written as x 2 ) stands for the probability of the occurrence of (x 1 , x 2 ). When the information source is memoryless specified with P X1X2 , we have the following equation holds: P X1X2 (x 1 , x 2 ) = n t=1 P X1X2 (x 1,t , x 2,t ). In this case we write P X1X2 (x 1 , x 2 ) as P n X1X2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Similar notations are used for other random variables and sequences. Consensus and Notations: Without loss of generality, throughout this paper, we assume that X 1 and X 2 are finite fields. The notation ⊕ is used to denote the field addition operation, while the notation is used to denote the field subtraction operation, i.e., a b = a ⊕ (−b) for any elements a, b of a same finite field. All discussions and theorems in this paper still hold although X 1 and X 2 are different finite fields. However, for the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation for field addition and subtraction for both X 1 and X 2 .
A. Basic System Description
First, let the information sources and keys be generated independently by different parties S gen and K gen respectively. In our setting, we assume the followings.
• The random keys K 1 and K 2 are generated by K gen from uniform distribution.
• The key K 1 is correlated to K 2 .
• The sources X 1 and X 2 are generated by S gen and are correlated to each other.
• The sources are independent to the keys.
Next, let the two correlated random sources X 1 and X 2 from S gen be sent to two separated nodes L 1 and L 2 respectively. And let two random key (sources) K 1 and K 2 from K gen be also sent separately to L 1 and L 2 .
Further settings of our system are described as follows, as shown in Fig. 1 .
1) Distributed Sources Processing:At node 1 , X 1 is encrypted with the key K 1 using encryption scheme Enc 1 , and at node 2 , X 2 is encrypted with the key K 2 using encryption scheme Enc 2 . The ciphertexts
are defined by
2) Transmission: Next, the ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 are sent to a common information processing center D through two separated public communication channels. Meanwhile, the keys K 1 and K 2 are sent to D through private communication channels.
3) Joint Sink Node Processing: In D, we decrypt the ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 ) using the keys (
It is obvious that for each i = 1, 2, we can correctly reproduce the source outputs X i from C i and K i by the decription function Dec i .
Eavesdropper Adversarial Model (Informal Description)
An eavesdropper adversary A eavesdrops all public communication channels in the system and output/estimate the original data from information sources.
III. PROPOSED IDEA: AFFINE ENCODERS AS PRIVACY AMPLIFIER
Let
2 ) be a pair of linear mappings φ
where A i is a matrix with n rows and m i columns.
For each i = 1, 2, the mapping ϕ i , i = 1, 2, those satisfy the following affine structure:
Note that ψ (n) does not have a linear structure in general.
Description of Proposed procedure :
We describe the procedure of our privacy amplified system as follows.
1) Encoding of Ciphertexts:
First, we use ϕ
and ϕ
to encode the ciphertexts C
Then, instead of sending C 1 and C 2 , we sendC 
where
Decoding at Joint Sink Node D: First, using the pair of linear encoders (ϕ (
in the following way. From (7), we have that for each i = 1, 2, the decoder D can obtain
2 ) as follows:
Our privacy amplified system described above is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
On Reliability
From (8), it is clear that the decoding error probability p e is as follows:
On Security
2 ) is measured by the mutual information between those two random pairs. This quantity is formally defined by
Reliable and Secure Framework Definition 1: The quantity (R 1 , R 2 , F, G) is achievable for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ (n) ,
Definition 2: (Rate Reliability and Security
We call D Sys (P X1X2 ,P K1K2 ) the rate reliability and security region.
Definition 3 (Reliable and Secure Rate Region): We define the reliable and secure rate region R Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) for the system Sys by
We call R Sys (P X1X2 ,P K1K2 ) the reliable and secure rate region.
In this paper we derive good inner bounds of D Sys ( P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) and R Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ).
IV. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. To describe our results we define several functions and sets. Let X 1 and X 2 be arbitrary random variables over X 1 and X 2 respectively and P X1X2 is their joint distribution. Let P(X 1 ×X 2 )
denote the set of all probability distributions on X 1 ×X 2 . Similar notations are adopted for other random variables.
For R ≥ 0 and P X1X2 ∈ P(X 1 × X 2 ), we define the following three functions:
where [a] + : = max{0, a}. Furthermore, define
where R 3 := R 1 + R 2 . For random variable Z with distributions P Z on finite set Z and any R > 0, we define the following function:
For given P K1K2 ∈ P(X 1 × X 2 ), we define
Let us define the following two regions of (R 1 , R 2 ):
Then we have the following property:
Our main result is as follows.
where δ i,n , i = 1, 2 are defined by
Note that for i = 1, 2, δ i,n → 0 as n → ∞.
The functions F (R 1 , R 2 |P X1X2 ) and G(R 1 , R 2 |P K1 K2 ) take positive values if and only if (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R sw ( P X1X2 ) ∩R key (P K1K2 ). Thus, by Theorem 1, under (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R sw ( P X1X2 ) ∩R key (P K1K2 ), we have the followings:
• On the reliability, p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function F (R 1 , R 2 |P X1X2 ).
• On the security,
) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function G(R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ), Fig. 3 . The inner bound Rsw(P X 1 X 2 ) ∩ R key (P K 1 K 2 ) of the reliable and secure rate region R Sys (P X 1 X 2 , P K 1 K 2 ).
• The code that attains the exponent functions F ( R 1 , R 2 |P X1X2 ) and G(R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ) is the universal code that depends only on (R 1 , R 2 ) not on the value of the distribution P X1X2 and P K1K2 .
From Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
A typical shape of R sw (P X1X2 ) ∩ R key (P K1K2 ) is shown in Fig. 3 .
V. SECURITY CRITERION BASED ON THE CORRECT PROBABILITY OF DECODING
On Security
An eavesdropper A who tries to estimate (
is always associated with its estimator function ψ A defined by
For given (P
) denote the success probability of A correctly estimating
2 ) using its estimation function ψ A with respect to the pair of linear encoders
2 ), under (P n X1X2 , P n K1K2 ).
Reliable and Secure Framework
Definition 4: The quantity (R 1 , R 2 , F, G) is achievable for the system Sys if there exists a sequence {(ϕ (n) ,
and for any eavesdropper A with ψ A :
Definition 5 (Rate Reliablity and Security Region): We define the rate reliability and security region D Sys (P X1 X2 , P K1K2 ) for the system Sys by
Definition 6 (Reliable and Secure Rate Region): We define the reliable and secure rate region R Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) for the system Sys by
Our aim is to derive good inner bounds of D Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) and R Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ). To describe our result we define a quantity related to a correct probability of source estimation.
Definition 7 (Source Uniformity): Let us define the following quantity:
Let P max := max (x1,x2)∈X1×X2 P X1X2 (x 1 , x 2 ). Then, by simple computation we have
We state the following lemma which is implied directly by the results of Oohama [7] .
Lemma 1: Fix positive ν arbitrary. In the proposed system, for any pair of encoder ϕ (n) = (ϕ
2 ), for any eavesdropper A with estimator function ψ A , the following holds.
January 17, 2018 DRAFT Since the proof of Lemma 1 is found in Oohama [7] , we omit the detail of the proof. Choosing ν = 1 in (18), we have
From (19) and Theorem 1, we have the following result.
Theorem 2: For any R 1 , R 2 > 0, there exists a sequence of mappings {(ϕ (n) , ψ (n) )} ∞ n=1 such that for any (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) with (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R sw (P X1X2 ) ∩ R key (P K1K2 ), we have
where δ i,n , i = 1, 2 are the same quantities as those in Theorem 1. Note that for i = 1, 2, δ i,n → 0 as n → ∞.
The functions F (R 1 , R 2 |P X1X2 ) and G(R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ) take positive values if and only if (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R sw ( P X1X2 ) ∩R key (P K1K2 ). Thus, by Theorem 1, under (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R sw (P X1X2 ) ∩R key (P K1K2 ), we have the followings:
• On the achievability, p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function F (R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ).
• On the security, for any ψ A , p c (ϕ (n) , ψ A |P n X1X2 , P n K1K2 ) goes to zero exponentially as n tends to infinity, and its exponent is lower bounded by the function G * (R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ), where
• The code that attains the exponent functions F (R 1 , R 2 |P X1X2 ) and G * (R 1 , R 2 |P K1K2 ) is the universal code that depends only on (R 1 , R 2 ) not on the value of the distribution P X1X2 and P K1K2 .
Corollary 2:
Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ) ⊆ D Sys (P X1X2 , P K1K2 ).
VI. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 2. To prove this theorem we use the method of types developed by Csiszár and Körner [8] . In the first subsection we prepare basic results on the types. Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several quantities related to error provability of decoding or security. In the second subsection we evaluate upper bounds of p e (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ) and p c (ϕ ) which holds for any ϕ (n) and any adversary A with ψ A . This result is stated in Lemma 7. In the third subsection we develop random coding argument to prove an important key lemma (Lemma 11) stating an existence of good universal code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ). In the fourth subsection we prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 4, Lemma 7, and Lemma 11.
A. Types of Sequences and Their Properties
In this subsection we prepare basic results on the types. Those results are basic tools for our analysis of several bounds related to error provability of decoding or security.
Definition 8: For any n-sequence x 1 = x 1,1 x 1,2 · · · x 1,n ∈ X 1 n , n(x 1 |x 1 ) denotes the number of t such that
The relative frequency {n(x 1 |x 1 )/n} x1∈X1 of the components of x 1 is called the type of x 1 denoted by P x1 . The set that consists of all the types on X 1 is denoted by P n (X 1 ). Let X 1 denote an arbitrary random variable whose distribution P X1 belongs to P n (X 1 ). For P X1 ∈ P n (X 1 ), set
Similarly for any two n-sequences
denotes the number of t such that (x 1,t , x 2,t ) = (x 1 , x 2 ). The relative frequency {n(x 1 , x 2 |x 1 , x 2 )/n } (x1,x2)∈ X1×X2 of the components of (x 1 , x 2 ) is called the joint type of (x 1 , x 2 ) denoted by P x1,x2 . Furthermore, the set of all the joint type of
denote an arbitrary random pair whose distribution P X1X2 belongs to P n (X 1 ). For P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ), set
Furthermore, for P X1 ∈ P n (X 1 ) and
For set of types and joint types the following lemma holds. For the detail of the proof see Csiszár and Körner [8] .
, we have
and (
January 17, 2018 DRAFT By Lemma 2 parts b) and d), we immediately obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3:
In this subsection we evaluate upper bounds of p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ) and p c (ϕ
), we derive an upper bound which can be characterized with a quantity depending on (φ (n) , ψ (n) ) and joint type P x1,x2 of sequences (s
and P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ) we define the following functions.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4:
In the proposed system, for any pair of linear encoders
2 ) and for any joint decoder ψ (n) , we have
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from the definition of Ξ x1,x2 (φ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Step (b) follows from that the probabilities
take an identical value.
Step (c) follows from the definition of Ξ X1X2 (φ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Step (d) follows from lemma 3.
We next discuss upper bounds of
On an upper bound of I( C m1 1 , C m2 2 ; X 1 , X 2 ), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5:
where P U1 m 1 U2 m 2 represents the uniform distribution over X m1 1 × X m2 2 . Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:
).
Step (a) follows from
), we define the following quantities:
From the above definition, we can regard
as a probability distribution on X m1 1 ×X m2 2 . We denote this probability distribution by Ω K1K2;ϕ (n) . By the definition of Ω K1K2;ϕ (n) , for P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ), we have the following:
Furthermore, we define
Lemma 6:
Proof: By (25) and the convexity of divergence we have
Step (a) follows from Lemma 3. Hence, it suffices to derive an upper bound of
). Since
) has the obvious upper bound [log(|X 1 ||X 2 |)]n. Note that this quantity is larger than n.
We next derive another upper bound of
). Using that the inequality
holds for any positive number u, v, we obtain
From (28) and the upper bound [log(
) larger than n, we have
Combining (27) and (29), we have the bound (26) of Lemma 6.
Combining Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7:
In the proposed system, for any pair of encoder
2 ), for any eavesdropper A with estimator function ψ A , we have
The bound (23) in Lemma 4 implies that upper bounds of Ξ X1X2 (φ (n) , ψ (n) ) for P X1X2 lead to derivations of good error bounds on p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ). Furthermore, the bound (30) in Lemma 7 implies that good upper bounds of ∆ K1K2 (ϕ (n) ) for P K1K2 lead to derivations of good secure upper bounds on p c (ϕ
). In the next subsection we discuss an existence of universal code
such that the quantities Ξ X1X2 (φ (n) , ψ (n) ) for P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ) and ∆ * K1K2
(ϕ (n) ) for P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 ×X 2 ) attain the bound of Theorem 1.
C. Random Coding Arguments
We construct a pair of affine encoders ϕ (n) = (ϕ
2 ) using the random coding method. For the joint decoder ψ (n) , we propose the minimum entropy decoder used in Csiszár [3] and Oohama and Han [9] .
Random Construction of Affine Encoders: We first choose m i , i = 1, 2 such that
where a stands for the integer part of a. It is obvious that for i = 1, 2, we have
By the definition (4) of φ (n)
i , i = 1, 2, we have that for each i = 1, 2 and for
where A i is a matrix with n rows and m i columns. By the definition (5) of ϕ (n)
i , i = 1, 2, we have that for each i = 1, 2 and for 
b) For each i = 1, 2, for any s i ∈ X n i , and for any s
c) For each i = 1, 2, for any s i , t i ∈ X n i with s i = t i , and for any s
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A. We next define the joint decoder function
To this end we define the following quantities. Definition 9: For (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ X n 1 × X n 2 , we denote the conditional entropy and entropy calculated from the joint type P x1,x2 by H(x 1 |x 2 ) and H(x 1 x 2 ), respectively. In other words, for a joint type P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ) such that P X1X2 = P x1,x2 , we define H(x 1 |x 2 ) = H(X 1 |X 2 ) and H(x 1 x 2 ) = H(X 1 X 2 ).
Minimum Entropy Decoder
as follows: 
Lemma 9: For any n and for any P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ),
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B.
Estimation of Approximation Error: Define
Lemma 10: For any k
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C. We have the following corollary from Lemma 10.
Corollary 3: For any P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ), we have
Existence of Good Universal Code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ): From Lemma 9 and Corollary 3, we have the following lemma stating an existence of good universal code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ).
Lemma 11: There exists at least one deterministic code (ϕ
such that for any P X1X2 , P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ),
Step (a) follows from Lemma 9 and Corollary 3.
Step (b) follows from Lemma 2 part a). Hence there exists at least one deterministic code (ϕ (n) , ψ (n) ) such that
from which we have that
for any P X1X2 , P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ). Thus we have
for any P X1X2 , P K1K2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ).
D. Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection we prove Theorem 1 using Lemma 4, Lemma 7, and Lemma 11.
Proof of Theorem 1: By Lemma 11, there exists (
We first prove (9) in Theorem 1. On an upper bound of p e (φ (n) , ψ (n) |P n X1X2 ), we have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from Lemma 4 and (36).
Step (b) follows from that for any P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ),
Step (c) follows from Lemma 2 part a). We next prove (10) in Theorem 1. On an upper bound of
, P n K1K2 ) we have the following chain of inequalities:
Step (a) follows from Lemma 7 and (37).
Step (b) follows from that for any P X1X2 ∈ P n (X 1 × X 2 ), we have
Step (c) follows from Lemma 2 part a).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 8
In this appendix we prove Lemma 8. The suffix i in X i used to distinguish X 1 and X 2 in Lemma 8 is not essential for the proof. In the following argument we omit this suffix. Let X be a finite field and let Λ be an n × n invertible matrix, whose entries are from X . Let φ : X n → X m be a linear map with φ(xΛ) = xΛA for x ∈ X n .
Here A is a matrix with n rows and m colomus. Let ϕ : X n → X m be an affine map with ϕ(s) = sA ⊕ b Step (a) follows from (41).
Step (b) follows from that n random vecotors A m l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n are independent. We next prove the part b). We have the following: Step (a) follows from (43).
Step (b) follows from the independent property on A m l , l = 1, 2, · · · , n and B m .
B. Proof of Lemma 9
For simplicity of notation, we write M i = |X i | mi , i = 1, 2. We also use those notations in the arguments of other appendixes.
Proof of Lemma 9: For x 1 ∈ X n 1 , x 2 ∈ X n 2 we set B(x 1 x 2 ) = (x 1 ,x 2 ) : H(x 1x2 ) ≤ H(x 1 x 2 ) , Px 1 = P x1 , Px 2 = P x2 , B(x 1 |x 2 ) = x 1 : H(x 1 |x 2 ) ≤ H(x 1 |x 2 ), Px 1 = P x1 , B(x 2 |x 1 ) = x 2 : H(x 2 |x 1 ) ≤ H(x 2 |x 1 ), Px 2 = P x2 .
Using parts a) and b) of Lemma 2, we have following inequalities:
|B(x 1 |x 2 )| ≤ (n + 1) |X1||X2| 2 nH(x1|x2) ,
|B(x 2 |x 1 )| ≤ (n + 1) |X1||X2| 2 H(x2|x1) .
On an upper bound of E[Ξ x1,x2 (φ (n) , ψ (n) )], we have the following chain of inequalities:
Pr φ 
